We describe a family of efficient codes for cryptographic purposes and dedicated algorithms for their manipulation. Our proposal is especially tailored for highly constrained platforms, becoming competitive with conventional schemes.
elliptic curve version or otherwise). To face this scenario, several cryptosystems have been proposed that apparently resist attacks mounted with the help of quantum computers. The security of these so-called post-quantum cryptosystems [8] stems from quite distinct computational intractability assumptions. Such schemes are not necessarily newfor instance, cryptosystems based on coding theory (specifically, on the intractability of the syndrome decoding problem, or SDP) are known for nearly as long as the very concept of asymmetric cryptography itself, though they have only recently been attracting renewed interest.
However, being quantum-resistant is not the only interesting feature of many post-quantum proposals-some of them are equally remarkable because of their improved efficiency and simplicity for certain types of applications relatively to conventional schemes. Thus, schemes based on the SDP entirely avoid the multiprecision integer arithmetic typically needed by IFP or DLP cryptosystems, and their computational cost is usually a few orders of complexity smaller than those systems, reachingÕ(n) instead ofÕ(n 2 ) orÕ(n 3 ) which are commonplace in pre-quantum schemes. This indicates that post-quantum alternatives may have advantages even in situations where quantum attacks are not the main concern, and justifies the investigation on how advantageous they can be in practice.
Particularly interesting scenarios where such post-quantum schemes may have a positive impact are wireless sensor networks [2, 40] and the so-called "Internet of Things," in which a wide range of devices are interconnected, from the most powerful clustered servers to embedded systems with extremely limited processing resources, storage, bandwidth occupation and power consumption, including microcontrollers [30, 47] and dedicated hardware [32] .
One of the leading families of post-quantum cryptographic schemes is that of code-based cryptosystems [33, 39] . In contrast with the form in which these systems were originally proposed, where key sizes were typically large, modern approaches do offer far more space-efficient parameters, being fairly practical on general-purpose platforms. One can thus ask whether such schemes are suitable for highly constrained platforms as well.
Low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and their quasicyclic variants (QC-LDPC) have been proposed for cryptographic applications [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 29, 36, 46] although in a form still unsuitable for constrained platforms. Recently, quasicyclic moderate-density parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes have been designed to provide strong security assurances for McEliece-style cryptosystems [35] . Such codes are arguably ideal for modern general-purpose platforms, matching or surpassing the processing efficiency of conventional cryptosystems. However, no assessment of their suitability for constrained platforms has been made, and indeed the traditional bit-flipping and belief-propagation decoding methods, even though they are quite processing-efficient, appear at first glance unsuitable for embedded or Internet-of-Things scenarios due to their considerable storage requirements.
Our contributions in this paper are twofold:
-A family of linear error-correcting codes (so-called CS-MDPC codes) that are highly efficient for cryptographic applications in terms of reduced key size; -An efficient decoder for (a superset of) that family of codes that is especially tailored for, though not restricted to, constrained platforms, and may have an independent interest in non-cryptographic contexts.
Specifically, we show how to obtain code-based cryptosystems where the public keys are closer in size to the corresponding RSA keys at practical security levels than any previous proposal in the literature. A careful selection of design features for the key generation, encoding, and decoding algorithms leads to very short processing times, and executable code size in software or area occupation in hardware (and thus potentially also energy consumption) tend to be considerably smaller than what can be attained with RSA or elliptic curve cryptosystems. Our proposed variant of the bit flipping decoding technique needs only O(1) ancillary storage, in comparison with O(n) (where n is the code length) as in previous variants of that technique. The decoder, though designed with CS-MDPC codes in mind, is equally suitable (with minimum modifications at most) for any family of block codes where the blocks can be seen as representing ideals in some commutative ring of square matrices. As a general rule, our metric will be the typical storage and speed available on devices that can be plugged directly to the Internet by virtue of supporting a TCP/IP protocol stack, and hence can be properly considered Internet-of-Things plat-forms (for instance, certain PIC24F processors, which operate at 32 MHz and offer 8 KiB RAM and 32 KiB ROM). The remainder of this document is organized as follows: We provide theoretical preliminaries in Sect. 2, including LDPC and MDPC codes, the hard decision decoding method, and code-based cryptosystems. We describe the new family of codes and assess its security properties in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we outline our proposed techniques to deploy codebased cryptosystems on embedded platforms, in particular an efficient bit-flipping decoder that takes only O(1) ancillary storage instead of the usual O(n) requirements. We illustrate some suggested parameters for typical security levels in Sect. 5 and assess the overall results of our proposal experimentally in Sect. 6. We conclude in Sect. 7.
Preliminaries

General notation
Matrix and vector indices will be numbered from 0 throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated.
Let q be a prime power. The finite field of q elements is written F q . Given h ∈ F r q , we denote by cir(h) the circulant matrix
The name 'circulant' stems from the fact that the elements on each row are cyclically shifted to the right when passing from one row to the next below it. Notice that this cyclical shift is to the right, not to the left: right-circulant matrices form a proper subring (a commutative one, for that matter) of F r ×r q , while left-circulant matrices, also called Hankel matrices, do not.
Error correcting codes
A (binary) linear [n, k] error-correcting code C is a subspace of F n 2 of dimension k. Such a code is specified by either a generator matrix G ∈ F k×n
We will be particularly interested in quasi-cyclic codes, namely, codes with n = n 0 b and k = k 0 b (thus also r = r 0 b) for some b, n 0 , k 0 (and r 0 ), admitting a parity-check matrix consisting of r 0 × n 0 circulant square blocks of size b × b. Since each b × b block can be represented by a single b-bit sequence, the total space occupied by any such matrix is r 0 n 0 b instead of r 0 n 0 b 2 bits. The minimum required space is therefore attained by codes where b = r (and hence r 0 = 1 and k 0 = n 0 −1), since a parity-check matrix H = [cir(h 0 ) | · · · | cir(h n 0 −1 )] is entirely defined by the concatenation h 0 || · · · || h n 0 −1 of the first row of each block and hence occupies n 0 b bits, or just
The syndrome decoding problem (SDP) consists of computing an error pattern e ∈ F n 2 given a parity-check matrix H ∈ F r ×n 2 for the underlying code, and a syndrome s = eH T ∈ F r 2 . In general the SDP is NP-hard, but sometimes the knowledge of certain structural code properties makes this problem solvable in polynomial time.
LDPC codes
LDPC codes were invented by Gallager [22] and are linear codes obtained from sparse bipartite graphs (called Tanner graphs). Suppose that G is a graph with n left nodes (called message nodes) and r right nodes (called check nodes). The graph gives rise to a linear code of block length n and dimension at least n − r in the following way: The n coordinates of the codewords are associated with the n message nodes. The codewords are those vectors (c 1 , . . . , c n ) such that for all check nodes the sum of the neighboring positions among the message nodes is zero.
The graph representation is analogous to a matrix representation via the parity-check matrix H , which is simply the adjacency matrix of the Tanner graph. In this sense, any linear code has a Tanner graph representation (which, like the parity-check matrix itself, is not unique). However, not every binary linear code has a representation by a sparse bipartite graph. If it does, then the code is called a low-density paritycheck (LDPC) code. We will be particularly interested in LDPC codes which are also quasi-cyclic. Specifically, quasicyclic low-density parity-check (QC-LDPC) codes [13, 45] admit r × n parity-check matrices consisting of n 0 horizontally joined circulant square sparse blocks of size r × r , with n = n 0 r (as well as dense systematic parity-check matrices of the same size and circulant structure).
MDPC and QC-MDPC codes
A cryptographically interesting subclass of the LDPC family is that of moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes and their quasi-cyclic variant (QC-MDPC) [35] .
In that approach, the column weight d v of some particular parity-check matrix is set low enough to enable decoding by Gallager's belief propagation and bit flipping methods devised for LDPC codes, yet high enough to prevent attacks based on the presence of too sparse words in the dual code like the Stern attack [44] and variants, without losing too much of the error correcting capability so as to keep information-set decoding attacks [9, 10] infeasible. MDPC and QC-MDPC codes also address the need to prevent structural attacks as proposed by Faugère et al. [19] and by Leander and Gauthier [23] , whereby cryptographically-oriented codes must remain as unstructured as possible except for the hidden trapdoor that enables private decoding and, in the case of quasi-cyclic codes, external symmetries that allow for efficient implementation. The very circulant symmetry might introduce weaknesses as pointed out by Sendrier [43] , but these induce only a polynomial (specifically, linear) gain in attack efficiency, and a small adjustment in parameters copes with it entirely. Typical densities in this case are in range 0.4-0.9 % of the code length, one order of magnitude above LDPC codes but certainly within the realm of Gallager codes. The code construction itself is as random as possible, merely keeping the desired density and circulant geometry.
Gallager's hard decision (bit flipping) decoding method
We briefly recapitulate Gallager's hard decision decoding algorithm, closely following the very concise and clear description by Huffman and Pless [27] . This will provide the basis for the efficient variant we propose for embedded platforms.
Assume that the codeword is encoded with a binary LDPC code C for transmission, and the vector c is received. In the computation of the syndrome s = cH T , each received bit of c affects at most d v components of that syndrome. If only the jth bit of c contains an error, then the corresponding d v components s i of s will equal 1, indicating the parity check equations that are not satisfied. Even if there are some other bits in error among those that contribute to computation of s i , one expects that several of the d v components of s will equal 1. This is the basis of Gallager's hard decision decoding, or bit-flipping, algorithm.
Compute cH T and determine the unsatisfied parity checks
(namely, the parity checks where the components of cH T equal 1). 2. For each of the n bits, compute the number of unsatisfied parity checks involving that bit. 3. Flip the bits of c that are involved in the largest number of unsatisfied parity checks. 4. Repeat steps 1, 2, and 3 until either cH T = 0, in which case c has been successfully decoded, or until a certain bound in the number of iterations is reached, in which case decoding of the received vector has failed.
The bit-flipping algorithm is not the most powerful decoding method for LDPC codes; indeed, the belief propagation technique [22, 27] is known to exceed its error correction capability. However, belief-propagation decoders involve computing ever more refined probabilities that each bit of the received word c contains an error, thus incurring float-ing point arithmetic or suitable high-precision approximations and computationally expensive algorithms. In a scenario where the number of errors is fixed and known in advance, as is the case of cryptographic applications, parameters can be designed so that the more powerful but also more complex and expensive belief propagation methods are not necessary for decoding.
We therefore focus on the problem of designing an optimized variant of bit-flipping decoding for highly constrained platforms. Specifically, such methods still suffer from the drawback of requiring a large amount of ancillary memory for counters: if each column of H has Hamming weight d v , step 2 requires ( lg d v +1) bits to store the number of unsatisfied parity-checks for each of the n bits of c, hence n( lg d v + 1) bits overall. Besides, steps 2 and 3 involve a loop of length n each, introducing processing inefficiency. We will show how to avoid these drawbacks in Sect. 4.3.
Niederreiter encryption
The McEliece encryption scheme was proposed by McEliece [33] in 1978. In that scheme, the public key is a generator matrix for a certain code whose decoder is taken to be the private key. A matching scheme using a parity-check matrix as public key was proposed by Niederreiter in 1986 [39] . Although the security of these two schemes is equivalent, Niederreiter is the more efficient [11] , being therefore the method of choice for constrained platforms. We briefly describe this scheme, which consist of three algorithms (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt):
-KeyGen: Select a binary t-error correcting [n, k]-code C with a decoding trapdoor D and an r × n parity-check matrix H in systematic form, where r = n − k. The public key is (H, t), and the private key is the decoding trapdoor D. -Encrypt: To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ Z/ n t Z into a cryptogram c ∈ F r 2 , encode m into a vector e ∈ F n 2 of weight t via some conventional permutation unranking method, and compute c ← e · H T . -Decrypt: To decrypt c ∈ F n 2 , apply the decoding trapdoor D to the syndrome c (thus finding the corresponding vector e ∈ F n 2 of weight t), then decode m ∈ Z/ n t Z from e via permutation ranking.
An efficient family of QC-MDPC codes
As we pointed out, QC-MDPC codes are among the most efficient settings for code-based cryptosystems. However, QC-MDPC parameters for practical security levels, specifically those corresponding to a cost between a legacy-level 2 80 and a top-level 2 256 steps to mount the best possible attacks, yield key and ciphertext space overheads that are still too large, and hence generally unsuitable, for constrained platforms.
It turns out we can do better with a proper subset of QC-MDPC codes. To define it, we now introduce a class of matrices that admit a space-efficient representation: Definition 1 Given a finite field F q and an integer p, the set of cyclosymmetric matrices of order p over F q is the set CS p (F q ) of square p × p matrices over F q that are both circulant and symmetric.
Cyclosymmetric matrices constitute a proper subring of the ring F p× p q of p × p matrices over F q , which can be seen by the fact that the identity matrix is cyclosymmetric and that the product of symmetric matrices is itself symmetric iff the factors commute, and indeed circulant matrices are commutative: (AB) T = B T A T = B A = AB (all other properties are trivial). We call this the cyclosymmetric ring of order p over F q .
The interest in a cyclosymmetric ring resides in the fact that elements of CS p (F q ) can be represented as a sequence of p/2 + 1 elements from F q , asymptotically occupying only half the space required by a merely circulant matrix of order p over F q . To see this, just note that a circulant p × p matrix has the form C i j = c ( j−i) mod p where c is the first row of that matrix, while a symmetric matrix satisfies C i j = C ji , thus combining both conditions yields c ( j−i) mod p = c (i− j) mod p , which for i = 0 (since the first row alone defines the entire matrix) simplifies to c j = c − j mod p , or c j = c p− j for j > 0. Therefore, the sequence c 1 , . . . , c p−1 is a palindrome (and c 0 is an arbitrary bit), and only c 0 , . . . , c p/2 +1 are independent.
Extending the analogy, we define the family of cyclosymmetric codes: Definition 2 A cyclosymmetric (CS) code over F q is a code which admits a block parity-check matrix whose blocks correspond to elements of CS p (F q ) for some q.
In other words, a cyclosymmetric [n, n − r ]-code admits an r × n parity-check matrix H with r = r 0 p, n = n 0 p, consisting of r 0 × n 0 cyclosymmetric blocks of size p × p over F q . A CS-MDPC code is, therefore, a cyclosymmetric MDPC code. The natural advantage of these codes is the compact representation of such a parity-check matrix. A particularly efficient case occurs when r 0 = 1 (hence r = p), that is, H is a simple sequence of n 0 cyclosymmetric blocks of size r × r : if H is in systematic form, it occupies only (n 0 − 1)( p/2 + 1) lg q bits.
For cryptographic applications, the natural choice is to adopt binary codes, i.e. q = 2, and in particular MDPC codes, due to the simplicity of the decoding algorithm and the greatly reduced parameters that these codes allow for every desired security level.
Code generation
Generating a random CS-MDPC code specified by a paritycheck matrix is a simple task. Since each p × p block must have row (or column) weight d v and be defined by its first p/2 + 1 components, choose uniformly at random d v /2 distinct coordinates among the components with coordinates between 1 and p/2 inclusive, then set the component at coordinate 0 to be d v mod 2. The remaining p/2 elements on the first row of this block are obtained by reversing the bit sequence defined by elements of coordinates 1 to p/2 . Repeating this process n 0 times (one time for each block) yields the complete CS-MDPC parity-check matrix.
A parity-check matrixĤ := [Ĥ 0 | · · · |Ĥ n 0 −1 ] constructed as above exposes the decoding trapdoor. To hide the trapdoor, it would suffice to obtain a systematic parity-check for the same code, namely, H :
This requiresĤ n 0 −1 to be invertible, which can only happen if its row weight is odd, hence d v should be chosen to be odd. This way one can adopt the moderate-density parity-check matrixĤ as the private key, and the equivalent systematic parity-check matrix H as public key.
Security considerations
An immediate observation on the structure of cyclosymmetric codes is that one can optimize the Stern attack [9, 18, 44] and its variants by taking advantage of the form of each row of the parity-check matrix when performing linear algebra operations. Indeed, Stern tries to retrieve a row of low density from the dual code; since the first row consists of one element followed by a palindrome, and the remaining rows are rotated versions thereof, one can in principle reduce in half the overall effort incurred by row manipulations. However, this apparent improvement turns out to be ineffective: linear algebra operations immediately destroy the palindrome structure within the rows, thwarting the optimization and reverting the attack to its generic form.
Leon's attack [31] and related ones do not seem to benefit at all either, because they already ignore part of each row involved in linear algebra operations. Interestingly, a brute force attack would be faster than Leon's against cyclosymmetric codes because it would need to test only p/2 d v /2 rather than p d v elements, yet for any practical choice of parameters that number remains far above the cost of Stern's or similar attacks. For example, parameters for which the cost of the best known variants of Stern is about 2 80 with block size p = 5504 and private code density d v = 45, the cost of brute force would be p/2 d v /2 ≈ 2 181 . A similar observation applies to information-set decoding attacks [9, 10] : at most, one would expect an improvement by a factor of 2 in the attack cost. No structural attacks along the lines of Faugère et al. [19] or Leander and Gauthier [23] seem to apply either, since the CS-MDPC trapdoor is of a statistical rather than algebraic nature.
Apart from this, CS-MDPC codes appear to inherit most if not all of the security properties of the superclass of QC-MDPC codes, as indicated in Sect. 2.4. One consequence of all these considerations is that, to the best of our knowledge, the best attacks against CS-MDPC codes are precisely the best attacks against generic QC-MDPC codes.
Scaling the implementation to embedded platforms
We now discuss how to implement the Niederreiter cryptosystem efficiently with minimum computational resources. The central aspect of this task resides in a new, space-efficient variant of bit-flipping decoding, although other important optimizations are described as well.
General operation
The objects involved in CS-MDPC systems have a natural representation with sparse matrices and simple arithmetic: both matrix-matrix and matrix-vector products essentially coalesce into (vector-vector) cyclic convolution, for which efficient algorithms like Karatsuba [28] and FFT are known. However, plain 'textbook' multiplication algorithms, slightly modified so as to operate on circulant matrices represented by their first row alone, are not only more compact, but at least as fast (and often faster) than more advanced counterparts because of the sparsity of the arguments. Indeed, the operations that actually occur in the Niederreiter cryptosystem always involve at least one sparse operand: -inversion of a secret, sparse circulant matrix H yielding a public, dense matrix K : this is achieved with a carefully tuned extended Euclidean algorithm (see Sect. 4.2). -Computation of the public syndrome of a sparse error vector. This syndrome is the product of the public, dense parity-check matrix K by the sparse vector e. -Computation of the private, decodable syndrome s T = He T corresponding to a given public syndrome c T = K e T . This is the product H n 0 −1 c T of the sparse secret matrix H n 0 −1 by the given dense syndrome c T , since K = H −1 n 0 −1 H and hence H n 0 −1 c T = H n 0 −1 K e T = He T = s T . -Additionally, as we shall see, our strategy recovers the decodable syndrome s from a modified but nonzero syndromeŝ after a failed decoding attempt. Such an attempt yields an incorrect error vectorê of weight not exceeding a certain margin dependent on (and close to) t satisfying the relation s T =ŝ T + He T . Thus, recovering s involves the product He T of a sparse matrix by a sparse vector.
Interestingly, the McEliece cryptosystem does involve a product of a dense public generator matrix and a dense random vector in semantically secure constructions like Fujisaki-Okamoto [21] . This constitutes further reason to adopt the Niederreiter cryptosystem on constrained platforms.
Space-efficient convolutional inverse
The extended Euclidean algorithm yields a time-efficient method to compute the inverse of a circulant matrix H = cir(h). The technique consists of mapping the array h (with components h j , 0 j < r ) to a polynomial h(x) = 0 j<r h j x j ∈ F 2 [x], computing the modular inverse h(x) −1 (mod x r − 1), and mapping h(x) −1 back to an array denoted h −1 such that H −1 = cir(h −1 ).
An apparently less widely known, almost folklore property of the extended Euclidean algorithm is that it admits a space-efficient implementation as well. In its most usual form, when computing h −1 mod m the algorithm keeps track of four polynomials f, g, b, c ∈ F 2 [x] (plus two additional polynomials u, v ∈ F[x] that are usually only implicit) related by the constraints f = bh + um and g = ch + vm. This suggests a naive implementation requiring up to 4r bits of storage for those four polynomials. However, polynomials f and c can actually coexist on the same storage area, and similarly for polynomials g and b, as long as r + 2 bits are available for each of these pairs (totaling 2r + 4 bits) because, at any step of the algorithm execution, it holds that deg( f ) + deg(c) r and deg(g) + deg(b) r . One can easily prove this via Floyd-Hoare logic.
A space-efficient decoder
The technique of bit-flipping decoding has received a substantial amount of attention in the literature since Gallager's discovery of LDPC codes [12, 16, 22, 24, 34, 37, 38, [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] . However, these are mostly concerned with improving the error correction capability rather than reducing computational resource requirements. Even techniques designed for VLSI like the soft bit-flipping (SBF) technique [14, 15] , which might be potential candidates for implementation on the small processors typical of an Internet of Things scenario, turn out to take far more ancillary storage (namely, still O(n) for a code of length n) than is typically available on those processors.
It turns out that one can entirely avoid the need for the large storage requirements of a bit-flipping decoder. For cryptographic applications, where the number of introduced errors is fixed and known beforehand, the error correction capability is not the central concern, as long as the desired security level can be attained while fitting the available resources. The variant we propose targets precisely this need. We now describe that variant, together with a rationale for each decision. The full method is summarized as Algorithm 1.
On-the-fly counter update
The usual bit-flipping strategy requires two passes over the word variables at each step of the decoding process, namely, a first pass to determine the number of parity errors each variable is involved in (thus keeping an array of counters, one for each variable), and a second pass to tentatively correct the most suspicious variables, which are taken to be those whose parity error count is above a certain threshold. While the second pass could in principle be avoided by adopting a carefully designed data structure singling out the positions that do actually exceed the threshold, not only would maintaining such a structure be considerably expensive, but the approach is not effective for the better part of the decoding process since a large fraction of the variables is expected (and experimentally observed) to be deemed suspicious, to the effect that this whole approach turns out to be easily outperformed by plain counters in both storage requirements and processing time.
We avoid the second pass, the complicated data structure, and even the need to keep an array of counters by counting onthe-fly the number of parity errors each variables is involved in, then deciding immediately whether it has to be tentatively corrected, and modifying the syndrome accordingly.
A consequence of this is that the relation between the actual parity-error counts evaluated on-the-fly and the bit flipping threshold value is likely to change at each such correction, and the decisions that will be taken for variables not yet reached may differ from what they would be if the counters were computed separately. In fact, the parity error threshold becomes known only approximately (unless one took the effort to update it by checking all variables again each time one of them is corrected), but this turns up not to be detrimental to a successful correction of all errors; on the contrary, this is empirically observed to enhance the chance of a successful decoding for practical parameters. This can be explained by considering that the number of false positives and false negatives in the error detection heuristic for bits not yet processed is reduced whenever one real error is corrected: in other words, there is a better signal-to-noise ratio in the bit reliability estimation that would be missed if all counters were computed before any actual correction is attempted.
Needless to say, merely avoiding the second pass already roughly doubles the decoding speed.
Onset threshold estimation
As we pointed out, bit flipping works not only with the exact value of the parity-error threshold, but also with a reasonable estimate thereof. This holds equally well at the onset of the process, so that not even the initial (onset) parity-error threshold θ 0 needs to be exact, making initialization much simpler.
Analytically deriving a rigorous estimate of the best possible initial value is elusive, particularly because the coordinates of the d v nonzero components of the trapdoor paritycheck matrix are not independent but constrained by the cyclosymmetric block structure. Fortunately, this is not an obstacle for either the derivation of a close approximate threshold that can be validated experimentally, nor is an exact value critically relevant for the decoder performance, as we just pointed out.
An approximate onset threshold is obtained (offline and only once for each given parameter set) as follows. Each symbol in error would, in isolation, yield a count of d v parity errors. However, each parity check is influenced by n 0 d v symbols, so the actual count is expected to be smaller if the total number of symbols in error affecting any of those positions is even. The interference (noise) from all other n 0 d v −1 symbols affecting one particular parity check, given that one specific symbol is in error, would be ineffective if those other symbols contain an even number of errors. Because n 0 d v n and t/n 1, if the coordinates of the nonzero components of the trapdoor parity-check matrix were independent the probability of interference could be approximated by a binomial distribution
However, this approximation is distorted by the constraints imposed on the nonzero components of the trapdoor paritycheck matrix: even if the jth parity check is fully in this manner, the nearby parity checks (corresponding to a short cyclic shift of the jth row of the parity-check matrix) tend to get a much lower noise, typically one third of the above estimate, due to the very sparse nature of the parity-check matrix and the regularity of the cyclosymmetric structure, which breaks the alignment of interfering error. Thus a much better estimate for the actual probability of the approximate binomial distribution above is q ≈ 1 3 t−1 n−1 . So, with probability p associated to this refined estimate, any parity check among those that are put in error by a specific error symbol will actually indicate an error at that symbol. The number of unsatisfied parity checks corresponds to the number of such events, modeled once more by a binomial distribution, this time B (d v , p) . The expected number of unsatisfied parity checks for a symbol that is really in error will be, therefore,
The experimental validation of this estimate is done by generating a large number (say, of order 10 3 ) of codes uni- formly at random, then performing for each one a number (say, of order 10 3 as well) of decodings of uniformly generated error patterns of suitable weight, and finally tallying the initial maximum count of parity errors influenced by each variable. The empirical estimate of the initial parity-error threshold θ 0 is then taken to be the average of those maximum counts. The standard deviation is observed to be fairly small, so this approximation, which lies around a fraction 0.7-0.8 d v according to the values of r , t, and d v itself. It is also very close to the approximate theoretical value above as shown on the column labeled θ 0 in Table 1 , and leads to a surprisingly stable decoding behavior.
Threshold fine tuning
The actual parity-error threshold for bit-flipping does not need to be the very maximum current parity-error count among all variables. A faster variant is achieved by setting the threshold somewhere, say δ parity errors, below that maximum. Experimentally, a fine-tuned δ can improve decoding speed by an order of magnitude, so this variant is worthwhile. However, not only the decoding speed, but also the likeliness of decoding failure increases with growing δ, imposing a cutoff at a certain optimal point. As in the case of the onset threshold estimate, deriving an analytical value for the optimum δ is a difficult and elusive task. We therefore adopt an empirical estimate obtained from simulations here as well.
One could think of an apparently simpler strategy for obtaining thresholds by precomputing and storing estimates per iteration in the hope of improving performance. However, we point out that our strategy to obtain the threshold estimate dynamically simply reuses information that is readily available as a subproduct of counting the number of unsatisfied parity-checks per symbol bit, and incurs a very low overhead, namely, a single comparison of byte-sized counters per symbol bit, which is negligible in comparison with the whole counting process which takes time O(d v ). For practical parameters (see Table 1 ), this amounts to less than 2 % time overhead for legacy-level security, and can be as low as about 0.5 % for higher security levels. Dynamically refining the threshold also automatically accounts for unexpected fluctuations in the actual threshold value, which an offline process would necessarily fail to cope with and would hence be more likely susceptible to decoding errors than a dynamical threshold refinement. Besides, precomputed values would have to be stored on a table of threshold constants the size of the maximum number of decoding attempts, increasing storage occupation by O(tδ) integer values for each supported parameter set. For practical parameters, this would incur a cumulative storage increase of roughly 400-1,000 bytes according to the target security level (supporting all parameters on Table 1 would require more than 3 KiB overall, for instance).
Decoding failure handling
Because a large δ makes a decoding failure more likely, the decoder must be prepared to decrease the actual δ and restart the process.
Fortunately, rewinding the process to recover the original is easy to do in-place, as the difference between the original syndrome and the current one is the syndrome of the partial error pattern constructed by the decoder up to the failure detection.
Decoding failure is usually detected when a maximum number of decoding attempts is exceeded. Early detection is possible, however, by following the evolution of the weight of error pattern being reconstructed. Although that weight can temporarily surpass the final weight of t errors, in a successful decoding the provisional weight is very unlikely to be too large. A simple and sensible upper limit obtained from simulations is 3t/2 errors (i.e. allow the decoding process to accumulate spurious errors up to 50 % above the t limit before deciding for failure and decreasing δ), since no successful decoding has been observed to reach as high as this margin before the process begins to reduce it and converge to zero remaining parity errors.
Simple supporting algorithms
Sophisticated algorithms with a good asymptotic behavior turn out to be an unnecessary hindrance in the context of decoding at practical cryptographically-oriented parameters.
Thus, for instance, even though convolution-style algorithms may seem ideal to handle products of circulant matrices, in practice one of the factors is usually so sparse that the much simpler approach of just adding together a few rows or columns of the other factor-namely, those rows or columns indicated by the sparse factor-yields a faster outcome (and smaller executable code).
Likewise, representing the error pattern being reconstructed e as an unsorted list of error coordinates yields the most compact representation of e and is very efficient for cryptographic applications because of the relatively small target weight of e, even though this incurs sequential searches and updates.
The complete decoder
Taking all of the above considerations into account, we obtain an efficient variant of the hard-decision decoding method tailored for platforms with highly constrained data and code storage and processing power, which is described in full as Algorithm 1.
Suggested parameters
When choosing actual parameters for practical security levels, one has to take into account the complexity of the best known attacks against a code-based scheme. These attacks fall within two categories: those that seek to decode a particular syndrome directly (usually along the lines of information set decoding, or ISD) [9, 10, 20, 41] , and those that seek to recover the trapdoor itself [43, 44] (see also [35, Table  1] ). Algebraic attacks [19, 23] are not applicable here. Let D D(n, r, t) denote the cost of the best direct decoding attack (i.e. the first category) against a code of length n and codimension r seeking to obtain an error pattern of weight at most t, and let T R(n, r, w) denote the cost of the best trapdoor recovering attack (i.e. the second category) against a code of length n, co-dimension r and row density w.
These attacks could be applied generically to the scheme, but for cyclosymmetric codes there are three improved strategies that make use of the fact that only half the elements on the first row of a cyclosymmetric matrix are independent, more precisely by regrouping terms corresponding to the repeated components of cyclosymmetric blocks in certain equations:
corresponding to the relation H i =Ĥ −1 n 0 −1Ĥ i between the cyclosymmetric blocks of the private keyĤ and those of the public key H , where all blocks are taken from F r ×r q and theĤ i have column weight d v , as a smaller system
(reminiscent of a syndrome equation if we view theĤ i and the S i as vectors, since each block is defined by one single of its rows or columns) where all blocks are taken from F r/2 × r/2 q , the A i and S i only depend (linearly) on the H i , and theĤ i have column weight d v /2 . This is a direct decoding problem and can be solved with effort no larger than D D( n/2 , r/2 , n 0 d v /2 ). 2. Rewrite the above system by adding a column of blocks so as to keep the form of an orthogonality equation, namely,
The left factor has (n 0 − 1) r/2 rows and (n 0 + 1) r/2 columns. Hence it can be seen as the parity-check matrix of an [(n 0 + 1) r/2 , 2 r/2 ]-code that contains (at least r/2 ) short words of weight not exceeding n 0 d v /2 +1. Since this code is the dual of a code of co-dimension 2 r/2 , it enables a trapdoor recovery attack of cost at most T R((n 0 + 1) r/2 , 2 r/2 , n 0 d v /2 + 1). 3. Rewrite the system s = eH T defining a particular syndrome decoding problem using the same technique, obtaining a smaller system with blocks in F r/2 × r/2 q and half as many errors. This direct decoding attack only applies when both s and e display a cyclosymmetric structure as well, in which case its complexity is D D( n/2 , r/2 , t/2 ). Adopting a general error pattern e thwarts the attack (while also keeping the syndrome at length r rather than r/2 ).
Sample CS-MDPC parameters for typical security levels are listed on Table 1 . These parameters were obtained by checking the direct decoding and trapdoor recovering costs, adopting for D D(n, r, t) the cost estimate in [20] , and for T R(n, r, w) the cost estimate in [43] . Interestingly, parameters with n 0 = 2 turned out not to be competitive with n 0 = 3, which lead to shorter keys and cryptograms. Parameters trading slightly larger keys for slightly shorter syndromes are possible by choosing error patterns (and hence also syndromes) with cyclosymmetric structure, in which case the third attack strategy above becomes significant. Parameters for higher security levels would not fit the particular microcontroller we used for testing (see Sect. 6), and are therefore omitted.
Experimental results
We assessed the effectiveness of the techniques described herein according to the metrics of ROM and RAM usage by implementing the Niederreiter cryptosystem with the proposed parameters and decoder on the PIC24FJ32GA002-I/SP (32 MHz) platform, with 8 KiB RAM and 32 KiB ROM, in the C programming language (no assembly-level resources). Experiments were restricted to CS-MDPC codes at the 80-bit security level.
Mapping from raw plaintext (bit sequences) and error patterns is most efficiently achieved (in processing speed, data storage and executable code size requirements) with the Sendrier technique [42] . It was natural to adopt the same technique choosing CS-MDPC codes uniformly at random.
The observed program size (i.e. the ROM requirements for the deployed system) with the compiler employed is about 5.6 KiB. Storage (RAM) requirements are about 2.6 KiB overall, including the space needed for indices, counters and runtime bookkeeping (return addresses, stack management); splitting the code so that a key pair is generated by one program and used for encryption/decryption by another, the RAM requirements drop to only 1.5 KiB (for key generation) and less than 1 KiB (for encryption/decryption). By comparison, a plain implementation of the bit flipping technique would take at least 18 KiB for the counters alone, far above the 8 KiB RAM available on a PIC24FJ32GA002 microcontroller.
Observed running times, for 80-bit security level, were about 0.9 s for key pair generation, about 25 ms for encoding/encryption, and about 2.8 s for decoding/decryption (including the time needed to map the ciphertext syndrome to a privately decodable syndrome). To reduce the clock reading uncertainty, these times were obtained by measuring and averaging the total time needed to perform each of the operations on a reasonable number of randomly chosen instances, specifically, 1,000 uniformly random CS-MDPC codes for key generation, 10,000 random error patterns for encryption with each of 1,000 uniformly random codes CS-MDPC, and corresponding decryption of the obtained ciphertexts.
For comparison, elliptic curve ElGamal encryption at the same security level on the ATMega128L platform using the state-of-the-art RELIC library [1] demands 31-37 KiB ROM and 2-3 KiB RAM. Reported running times are 0.35-1.12 s for a single elliptic point multiplication by a scalar at the 80-bit security level.
Previous efforts to make code-based cryptography practical on embedded microcontrollers include Micro-Eliece [17] , Low-Reiter [25] . These works report very fast operation times on ATMega microcontrollers (notice that our implementation was made on TCP/IP-capable PIC24F devices): 0.45 s for encryption and 0.62 s for decryption in the case of Micro-Eliece [17, Table 4 ], and 1.6 ms for encryption and 0.18 s for decryption in the case of Low-Reiter [25, Table 3 ].
However, because of the adoption of Goppa codes, the earlier works are unable to generate key pairs on the AVR devices they target: the associated matrices must be precomputed elsewhere and then inserted in the device, reaching storage requirements between 72 and 438 KiB which force the use not only of Flash memory but also of even larger external memory (EEPROM or mask ROM). Also, because they exceed 32 KiB in size, they must be split into multiple parts, causing additional overhead [17, Section 5.1], [25, Section 5.1]. Our proposal, in contrast, enables key pairs to be generated in the device itself, so that the private key never leaves the hardware platform where it was created, according to standard security practice. Finally, no specific information is available on the executable code size needed by those proposals. Once again, because of the adoption of Goppa codes and their very complex manipulation, we conjecture that the executable size would be too large to fit the more stringent devices typical of the Internet of Things, let alone leaving space for high-level applications.
A very recent work [26] describes the implementation of QC-MDPC codes. Surprisingly, not even that work attempts to generate key pairs on the device, even though the process is much simpler for this family of codes than it is for Goppa codes. Reported timings are 0.8 s for encryption (far slower than 25 ms in our proposal) and 2.7 s for decryption (nearly matching our proposal at 2.8 s even though the platform is different). Storage requirements (counting SRAM and Flash occupation together) are 4.2 KiB for encryption and 2.3 KiB for decryption, far exceeding our storage requirements for these operations (less than 1 KiB). Besides, our implementation was made purely in C, while that work reports the use of inline assembly code for timing critical routines.
Conclusion
We described how to scale code-based cryptosystems to platforms with very constrained storage and processing resources. Central to our proposal is the adoption of quasicyclic LDPC codes coupled with a storage-efficient algorithm for key pair generation, a carefully tailored variant of hard-decision decoding, and fine-tuned parameters. The efficiency of the result is competitive with traditional cryptosystems like those based on elliptic curves.
